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Abstract: This paper presents, in the light of Keynesian theory and Keynes’ ideas and 
taking in account the emerging economies reality in nowadays global world, an exchange 
rate regime proposal for emerging countries with the capability of mitigating their external 
vulnerability and fragility and their dependence on foreign capital, and thus making 
possible the implementation of domestic macroeconomic policies that would lead to high 
levels of output and employment. For this purpose the paper revisits Keynes’ thinking and 
proposals with regard to both exchange rate policy and capital inflows, with a view to 
showing how they contribute to maintaining full employment, develops a Post Keynesian 
view on financial globalization and the behavior of exchange rate, and finally presents a 
strategy for an exchange rate regime with capital controls for emerging countries. 
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Resumo: Este artigo apresenta a luz da teoria keynesiana e das idéias de Keynes e levando 
em conta a realidade atual dos países emergentes num mundo globalizado, uma proposta de 
regime cambial para países emergentes que permita mitigar sua vulnerabilidade externa e 
dependência ao capital externo, tornando possível a implementação de políticas 
macroeconômicas domésticas que levem a mais altos níveis de produto e emprego. Para 
esta propósito, o artigo revê o pensamento e propostas de Keynes sobre política cambial e 
fluxos de capitais, procurando mostrar como tais políticas contribuem para a manutenção 
do pleno emprego, desenvolve uma visão pós-keynesiana sobre sistema financeiro 
globalizado e comportamento da taxa de câmbio, e, finalmente, desenvolve uma estratégia 
para um regime cambial com controle de capitais para países emergentes. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
  The exchange rate regime that mainstream economists and international financial 
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), usually consider ideal for 
emerging countries is one with a largely unregulated capitals market, where capital 
mobility is absolutely unrestricted, and a perfectly flexible exchange rate (IMF, 2002). 
Under such a regime, domestic financial assets (securities) are regarded as perfect 
substitutes for international securities, and thus effective monetary policy is defined by 
parity between domestic and international interest rates, i.e. monetary expansion brings 
down domestic interest rates to levels below the international rate, leading to capital flight 
and consequent exchange rate devaluation, whose beneficial effects on current transactions 
come to generate an expansion in aggregate demand, which raises domestic interest rates 
until equilibrium is re-established in the balance of payments; symmetrical effects are 
produced by restrictive monetary policy. 
Set against this, the need to permit the emerging countries to pursue contra-cyclical  
fiscal and, more importantly, monetary policies (which, incidentally are fundamental to 
assuring their sustainable economic growth and harmonious social development) has 
reinforced the opinion of Keynesian economists and some policymakers that what is needed 
is to introduce capital management techniques and an exchange rate regime that prevents 
excessive exchange rate fluctuations, in order to achieve macroeconomic stability, 
understood, following Keynes (1936/1964: Chapter 24), as being the combination of price 
stability and full employment.  
  In recent years, the debate over exchange rate regimes (floating vs. managed) and 
maintaining or relaxing capital controls in emerging countries has once again become the 
center of attention, mainly following developments from exchange rate and financial crises 
in Mexico (1994-95), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-99) and Argentina 
(2001-02)
1. Emphasizing this argument, according to Stiglitz (2002), financial 
liberalization and capital mobility in the 1990s were the center of most of the currency 
crises in the world economy.     
                                                
  The main outcome of this debate is that implementing a free-floating exchange rate 
regime and capital account mobility, even when backed by responsible or credible 
economic policy – in line with Washington Consensus prescriptions
2 –, leaves emerging 
countries prone to the humors and short-term logic of capital accumulation. The 
conventional argument on the difficulties facing such countries is to attribute the volatility 
 
1 These exchange rate and financial crises yielded a consensus among academics and policymakers 
as to the need to restructure the international monetary system as an indispensable condition for the 
world economy, and particularly the emerging economies, to see a return to periods of expansion 
and economic prosperity. While there is a consensus that the international monetary system needs 
restructuring, the same cannot yet be said with regard to the mechanisms proposed to mitigate 
and/or put an end to instability in world exchange and financial markets. On this point, Eichengreen 
(1999, Chapters 6 and 7), Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Davidson (1994, Chapter 16, and 2002, 
Chapter 14) and Isard (2005, Chapters 7 and 8) offer a summary of the main options for 
restructuring the international monetary system.  
2 The neo-liberal measures advocated for emerging countries by the Washington Consensus are as 
follows: (i) reduction or elimination of tariff barriers; (ii) free capital mobility, whether for foreign 
investment or for convertible currency transactions; (iii) fiscal discipline; (iv) tax reform; (v) 
financial deregulation; and (vi) privatizations.  of foreign financing to the irresponsible economic policies they adopt (Caramazza and 
Aziz, 1998)
3. The Keynesian view, meanwhile, regards floating exchange rate and high 
capital mobility as a destabilizing combination of factors that intensify exchange rate crises 
in emerging countries. Grabel (2003a), for instance, argues that the capital account 
liberalization and neo-liberal financial integration have brought some risks (currency, 
fragility, contagion, and sovereignty) to emerging countries.   
Looking at the GDP performance of some emerging countries, such as the BRICs 
countries (Brazil, Russia, China and India)
4, from 2000 to 2006, one can see that economic 
performance has differed among these countries: the annual average growth rate in Brazil 
was 3.1%, in Russia was 6.6%, in India was 6.4% and in China was 9.5%
5. Ferrari Filho 
and Paula (2006) show that the economic performance of BRICs countries in the 2000s is 
the result, at least partially, of the exchange rate regime, capital account convertibility and 
fiscal and monetary regimes adopted in each country. According to authors, “Russia, India 
and China, administrating their exchange rate regimes with restricted capital account 
convertibility, are cases of more or less successful macroeconomic policy management (...) 
[while] the more clearly liberal economic policy strategies adopted in the Brazilian 
economy (...) have not managed to assure the country sustainable growth” (Ibid.: 219). 
Considering the idea above, a question addresses: What is the appropriate exchange 
rate regime and capital account convertibility for emerging countries that, in conformity 
with fiscal and monetary policies, achieves stable and sustainable economic growth?   
  To answer this question, the purpose of this article is to present, in the light of 
Keynesian theory and Keynes’ ideas on exchange rate policy and capital mobility, an 
exchange rate regime proposal for emerging countries with the capability to mitigate their 
external vulnerability and fragility and their dependence on foreign capital, and thus 
making possible the implementation of domestic macroeconomic policies that would lead 
to high levels of output and employment. In an open economy, adopting an alternative 
exchange rate regime and limiting capital flows can be necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to assure sustained economic growth in emerging countries; indeed, it should be 
part of a set of a coordinated macroeconomic policy (such as exchange rate policy, 
monetary policy and fiscal policy) oriented to stimulate and create a favorable environment 
to economic growth.   
The main hypothesis developed in this paper is that a managed exchange rate and 
capital controls can play a key role in a macroeconomic policy oriented to achieve   
macroeconomic stabilization in emerging countries. On the evidence available (see, for 
example, Arestis, Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 2007, for relevant evidence in the case of Brazil; 
see also Angeriz, Arestis and Chakravarty, 2007) current arrangements of inflation and 
flexible exchange rate do not seem to work. 
                                                 
3 It is important to add that the conventional theory argues that a responsible economic policy is 
based on flexible exchange rate, capital mobility and inflation targeting regime.   
4 BRICs countries is an expression created by Goldman Sachs. The acronym BRIC comprises of the 
initials of the four important developing countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. According to 
the Goldman Sachs, in a report  of 2001, the combined GDP of BRICs countries would be larger 
than the total GDP of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom by 
2050.  
5 These average growth rates were calculated by the author based on figures of IPEA (2007) and 
IMF (2007).     To that end, the paper is divided into three sections, in addition to this introduction. 
The next section explores Keynes’ proposals, specially the International Clearing Union 
(ICU), with regard to both exchange rate policy and capital inflows, with a view to showing 
how they contribute to maintaining full employment. Section 3 develops a Post Keynesian 
view on financial globalization and the behavior of exchange rate. Section 4 presents a brief 
discussion of alternative exchange rate regimes and capital account mobility, followed by a 
strategy for an exchange rate regime with capital controls for emerging countries. Finally, a 
summary and some conclusions are offered. 
 
2. Keynes’ proposals on exchange rate policy and capital mobility 
 
  In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (GT), Keynes shows 
that in monetary economics, fluctuations in effective demand and level of employment 
occur because, in a world where the future is uncertain and unknown, economic agents 
prefer to withdraw currency, and consequently their decisions to spend, whether on 
consumption or investment, are postponed. In other words, agents withhold currency as a 
kind of safeguard against the uncertainty entailed by their precarious knowledge about 
expected yields from their production plans. 
Given that monetary economies do not necessarily converge to a position of full 
employment equilibrium
6, extra-market interventions, such as control and regulation, are 
fundamental to “containing the immanent tendencies to disintegration inherent to the 
market economy” (Carvalho and Sicsú, 2006: 15) and thus creating the conditions that 
would offset the problems created by the circumstances under which economic agents make 
decisions. As we know, Keynesian policies is related to the implementation of economic 
policies that intend to increase aggregate demand in order to create a stable environment 
(more safety and with less uncertainty of actual possibilities) that stimulate entrepreneurs to 
make new investments. According to Carvalho (1997: 40),  
“the ideal macroeconomic policy proposed by Keynes would in way 
inflate aggregate demand, expanding the economy like a balloon, 
leaving to private agents the decisions as to how the available 
resources would be employed (…). Boosting aggregate demand 
reduces both risks and so it should raise demand prices of that kind of 
asset with respect of money”.    
While market intervention is necessary in closed economies, there is even more call 
for regulation and control at the international level, where trade and financial transactions 
involve a variety of currencies and, therefore, uncertainty is far greater.   
With reference to the above idea, all Keynes’ proposals related to the international 
monetary system aimed at creating an international market maker that would be able to  
maintain full employment and price stability. To achieve such results, besides some 
adequate macroeconomic policies and institutional reforms, Keynes dedicated special 
attention to the monetary reform. According to him, the creation of an international 
liquidity currency was a fundamental condition to (i) assure the adequate elasticity of 
money supply to expanding the demand for investment and affect the global aggregate 
demand and (ii) bring in the funds necessary and sufficient for the process of short-term 
                                                 
6 It should be emphasized that, according to Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money (GT), unemployment is an equilibrium position.  balance of payments adjustment, thus galvanizing aggregate demand globally. Thus, in 
order for economic agents’ contractual decisions on spending to be taken in a less uncertain 
and unpredictable context, enabling effective demand to expand at the world level, it was 
indispensable to restructure the international monetary system on the basis of an 
international market maker able to perform the functions set out above. 
This is the direction taken by Davidson (1994, 2002), who builds on a taxonomy of 
his own, where the monetary dynamics among open economies may be of two types: 
unionized monetary system (UMS) or non-unionized monetary system (NUMS), to present 
a proposal for reform of the international monetary system called the International Money 
Clearing Union (IMCU). The idea consists in showing that Keynes’ proposals for 
restructuring the international monetary system, and more specifically for creating an 
international reserve currency managed by an international market maker, converge to a 
system with the characteristics of a UMS, that is: a relatively fixed exchange rates in 
relation to the international monetary standard; monetary contracts expressed in the 
international reserve currency; and a monetary policy designed to assure more flexible 
(elastic) international liquidity. Increasing the IMCU’s role in the world economy would be 
designed to prevent crises in effective demand, provide trigger mechanisms for 
automatically adjusting balance of payment disequilibrium, enable each nation to 
implement capital flow controls, and expand the amount of international liquidity 
(Davidson, 1994: 268). 
In many of his writings, Keynes discussed and suggested schemes to reform the 
international monetary system as fundamental to assuring contra-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies with a view to obtain full employment and promote income distribution 
and to prevent changes in the liquidity preference schedule from having an impact upon the 
demand for investment and aggregate demand, respectively
7. According to Carvalho (1997) 
and Ferrari Filho (2006), almost of the Keynesian proposals related to the international 
monetary system aimed at (i) substituting macroeconomic management for the blind 
acceptance of “invisible hand’s market”, (ii) reducing private agent’s uncertainties about 
the future in order to stimulate them on decision making related to production and 
investments, and (iii) creating a safe and flexible (more elastic) monetary system to expand 
the global effective demand and the level of employment.  
Looking at the Keynes’ proposals to reform the international monetary system, it is 
the Keynes’s revolutionary analysis in the ICU that deserves special attention. 
In his ICU, Keynes developed a proposal for restructuring the international 
monetary system in such a way that the world economy after World War II would assure 
conditions for full employment. Keynes argued that the discussions on restructuring the 
international monetary system should focus on setting up a world central bank (ICU), 
which would issue an international liquidity currency with a stable value standard. This 
Institution should be able to (i) set monetary and exchange rate rules, (ii) discipline trade 
policy, (iii) reorganize market dynamics in terms of the behavior of production, distribution 
                                                 
7 For instance, in A Treatise on Money (1930/1976), he outlined a proposal for the operation of a 
supranational central bank to maintain the stability of international price levels, in The Means to 
Prosperity  (1933/1972), he presented an international agreement under fixed, but alterable, 
exchange rates, and in his proposal for an International Clearing Union (1944/1980), Keynes 
developed a scheme based on an international currency, bancor.  and prices, (iv) regulate external investment, i.e. both venture and portfolio capital flows, 
and (v) signal rules for adjusting balance of payments (1944/1980: 233-234).  
Concerning item (i), Keynes recommended that participating countries should adopt 
a regime of exchange rates that would be fixed, but adjustable, in relation to the 
international currency – bancor (Keynes, 1944/1980: 170). He argued that exchange rate 
fluctuations should be discrete – in intervals of at most 5.0% for both deficit and surplus 
countries – with a view to righting any temporary balance of payment disequilibrium. In 
Keynes’ words: 
“We need an orderly and agreed method of determining the relative 
exchange values of national currency units, so that unilateral action 
and competitive exchange depreciations are prevented (…). The 
proposal is to establish a Currency Union, here designated an 
International Clearing Union, based on international bank money, 
called (let us say) bancor, fixed (but not unalterably) in terms of gold 
and accepted as the equivalent of gold” (Ibid.: 168-170). 
Items (iv) and (v) of the ICU (above) are the conditions by which, according to 
Keynes (1944/1980: 176), “[t]he plan aims at the substitution of an expansionist, in place of 
a contractionist, pressure on world trade”. 
As regards the capital flow controls, Keynes argued that: 
“control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should be a 
permanent feature of the post-war system (...). The advocacy of a 
control of capital movements must not be taken to mean that the era of 
international investment should be brought to an end. On the contrary, 
the system contemplated should greatly facilitate the restoration of 
international credit for loan purposes (…). The object (...) is to have a 
means of distinguishing – (a) Between movements of floating funds 
and genuine new investment for developing countries (…) and (b) 
Between movements, which will help to maintain equilibrium, from 
surplus countries to deficiency countries, and speculative movements 
or flights out of deficiency countries or from one surplus country to 
another” (Ibid.: 185-187). 
Keynes regarded capital controls as essential to preserving the flexibility of 
monetary policy to expand the demand for investment and, as a result, the aggregate 
demand and the level of employment. In his words, “the whole management of the 
domestic economy depends upon being free to have the appropriate rate of interest without 
reference to the rates prevailing elsewhere in the world” (Ibid.:149). 
Keynes’ idea concerned with capital controls began to be developed in the end of 
the 1920s, during the period he was policy advice at the Macmillan Committee – this 
Committee was created to present alternative proposals to England’s departure from the 
golden standard and to solve the British unemployment.  Keynes’ efforts (writings and 
speeches) in this Committee were related to, among others, the effect of tariffs and national 
protectionist trade policies, the effects of unrestricted foreign investment and the possibility 
of controlling capital flows
8.  
                                                 
8 For the Keynes’ activities during the Macmillan Committee, see Keynes (1981).  As regards the idea that the costs of balance of payment adjustments should be 
distributed among the two groups of countries (deficit and surplus), Keynes opposed the 
gold standard approach to the monetary system, where the whole onus of external 
adjustment fell to the deficiency countries. He argued that: 
“[i]t should be much easier, and surely more satisfactory for all of us, 
to enter into a general and collective responsibility, applying to all 
countries alike, that a country finding itself in a creditor position 
against the rest of the world as whole should enter into an arrangement 
no to allow this credit balance to exercise a contractionist pressure 
against world economy and, by repercussion, against the economy of 
the creditor country itself” (Ibid.: 178). 
In summary, from a brief examination of Keynes’ ICU proposal and considering the 
Keynes’ thinking in the 1930s related to exchange rate regime and capital controls, three 
points stand out clearly: firstly, Keynes felt that exchange rate stability was fundamental to 
assuring price stability; secondly, in general, he recommended the adoption of a fixed, but 
adjustable, exchange rate regime to reduce the private agents` uncertainties; and, finally, he 
argued that a regime of fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates could be adopted both in a 
world of very open capital account (during the gold standard period) and in a world where 
capital mobility was restricted (the period between the Wars). In other words, Keynesian 
analysis regards more or less managed exchange rate regimes and capital controls as 
serving the purposes of macroeconomic stability, understood as the combination of 
controlled inflation and sustainable economic growth. 
 
3. A Post Keynesian view on exchange rate and global financial markets  
 
As it is well known, Post Keynesian approach stress the importance of non-
probabilistic uncertainty in order to understand the modus operandi of capitalistic 
economies in a global environment. Post Keynesian economists reject the hypothesis of 
market efficiency to explain the behavior of financial markets (Glickman, 1994; Davidson, 
2002: Chapter 2). In an uncertain world, in which fundamentals do not provide a reliable 
guide to the future, as the informational basis related to human decision about the wealth 
accumulation is incomplete, the future forecasting about the price of financial assets are 
always subject to disappointments. Keynes and Post Keynesians reject the belief that some 
observed economic phenomena are the outcome of any stochastic process, because for 
some occurrences, agents do not possess adequate information to construct future 
probabilities. The intrinsic value of the given asset, related to the values derived from 
discount rate related to the expected returns of assets, do not exist, as the discount rate 
varies according to the risk evaluation that can suddenly change in response to the facts, 
and, for this reason, cannot be known. In other words, intrinsic value or fundamentals of the 
assets prices is not calculable in an environment under Knight-Keynes uncertainty 
(Glickman, 1994). 
Speculation is essentially a subjective activity of forecasting the psychology of the 
market (Keynes, 1936/1964: Chapter 12). As volatility is a consequence of speculation, 
markets must be organized in order to limit price fluctuations that include continuous assets 
selling orders. This must be done by the establishment of access rules to the participants of 
the financial market, and mainly by the presence of a powerful market maker. Only these 
rules are able to inhibit great speculation effects.  Concerning the operation of the global financial markets, the starting point of Post 
Keynesian analysis is that in the post-Bretton Woods world the combination of volatile 
exchange rates and financial liberalization has increased a great deal the international 
capital movements. However, in contrast to the conventional view of financial globalization 
– that stress the possible benefits of financial integration related to the more efficient 
international capital allocation, improvement in the macroeconomic policies due to the 
competitive pressures of globalization, development of domestic financial system due to 
better financial regulation, etc. (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003) – Post Keynesian 
view states that the increasing capital mobility is more unstable than stable, as it increases 
the likelihood of financial/currency crises and at the same time it results hard to manage 
economic policies
9. Financial globalization increases the opportunities for investment 
finance, but at the same time it has been a source of big economic instability with effects on 
real variables, such as output and employment. Under the action of global players, in a 
more liberalized and integrated financial market, the operation of the financial markets has 
become a sort of big, global casino. 
Post Keynesian economists and also other Keynesians of other theoretical 
approach
10 show that market liberalization and the rise of new financial instruments, as 
derivatives, increased the possibility of speculative operations in global financial markets
11. 
In contrast with closed financial markets of yesterday, capital flows can have disruptive 
action on countries, damaging the autonomy of domestic macroeconomic policies, and even 
generate speculative attacks on domestic currencies. As Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz 
(1995: 164) state, “volatility in exchange rates and interest rates induced by speculation and 
capital flows could have real economic consequences devastating for particular sectors and 
whole economies”. 
One example of such view is the determination of exchange rate, that, under the 
conditions of capital mobility, is increasingly determined by portfolio decisions of 
international investors, more related to a short-run view. Capital flows has been frequently 
a predominant force in foreign exchange markets, mainly in the case of emerging 
economies with thin financial markets, so that exchange rate behavior has been far too 
volatile for their only determinants to have been fundamental in origin (Harvey, 2003). 
Portfolio decisions are dependent from the changes in the market sentiment, that is 
investors’ portfolio expectations. Such expectations are modeled using a combination of 
Post Keynesian conventional tools – such as the convention that economic agents consider 
the average opinion of the market when they make their own expectations – and other 
factors of psychological nature.  According to Harvey (Ibid.: 133),  
“the picture that emerges is not one of a market characterized by 
stability, efficiency and optimality (…), but of an institution where 
agents’ imperfectly considered actions create currency prices. Those 
actions may be marked by stability for long periods (…) as agents rely 
on convention to anchor to stable levels or rates of change; but 
                                                 
9 An interesting evaluation of the costs and benefits of globalization is done by Eatwell and Taylor 
(2000, Chapter 2).  
10 For a criticism on financial liberalization, see Tobin (1978) and Stiglitz (2000).  
11 For instance, Davidson (1997: 671-672) states that “in today’s global economy any news event 
that fund managers even suspect that others will interpret as a whiff of currency weakness can 
quickly become a conflagration spread along the information highway. This results in lemming-like 
behavior that can be self-reinforcing and self-justifying”.  because they are subject to availability and bandwagon effects they are 
apt to rapid revision in the face of salient events (even when those 
events may seem inconsequential to cooler hands)”. 
Post Keynesian call attention for the increasing instability of financial markets in 
the current phase of globalization. Financial instability and speculative attacks on domestic 
currency can not be seen as anomalies, but on the contrary they are expected, and possible 
outcomes that emerge from the operation of global financial markets in a non-ergodic 
system where there is no safeguarding framework act as an overall market maker. In other 
words, a specific institutional design of a financial  market determines its potential as an 
environment where speculation can flourish (Alves Jr, Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 1999-2000).  
As a consequence of their understanding of the foreign exchange market and the 
operation of financial markets, the most common recommendation of Post Keynesian 
economists with respect to the organization of international economy is that flow of capital 
should somehow be controlled
12. Financial activity engenders systemic risks important 
enough to justify domestic regulation and capital controls. Grabel (2003a: 333) argues that 
“[a] programme of crisis prevention in emerging economies necessitates the 
implementation of a complementary policies [for instance, capital controls, such as a 
Chilean model]”. In this connection, Tobin (1978) interestingly stated that the main 
macroeconomic problem related to integrated financial markets is not the choice of the 
appropriate exchange rate regime but the excessive short-run capital mobility that reduces 
the autonomy of national governments to pursue domestic objectives with respect to 
employment, output and inflation. In Tobin’s words, “the mobility of financial capital 
limits viable differences among national interest rates and thus severely restricts the ability 
of central banks and governments to pursue monetary and fiscal policies appropriate to 
their internal economies” (Ibid.: 154)
13. 
In other words, free portfolio capital flows (mainly in emerging countries) may 
interfere with ability to put in place policies oriented to domestic purposes, as they 
frequently generate a high interest rate-bias
14, higher exchange rate volatility, and a limit 
for the use of active fiscal policies, due to the need to generate fiscal surplus in order to 
compensate the effects of a tight monetary policy on public debt. Under these conditions, 
                                                 
12 According to Grabel (1996: 1764), a “developing country government that seeks to attract and 
maintain portfolio investment inflows may be severely constrained in the ex  ante  sense: the 
construction of an appropriate investment climate requires the adoption of a fairly restrictive set of 
policies. In addition to the en ante constraint on policy autonomy, there is also the possibility of an 
ex post constraint. This may obtain if, in the advent of capital flight or financial or currency crises, 
the government is compelled to adopt measures aimed at reversing the outflow of portfolio 
investment”.  
13 In a regime of fully open capital account, interest rates by arbitrage can be reduced to a level 
equal to the one dictated by uncovered interest rate parity; i.e. international interest rates plus the 
risk premium required for foreign investors to buy domestic assets plus the expected rate 
depreciation of domestic currency. 
14 High interest rate-bias in emerging countries is related to the use of interest rate to mitigate 
movements of exchange rate devaluation due to the “fear of floating” behavior of monetary 
authorities, and the uses of interest rates in countries that adopt inflation targeting regime, mainly in 
case of countries that had recent history of high inflation where pass-through of exchange rate 
devaluation to domestic inflation is higher than other countries where agents do not have 
inflationary memory. See, for instance, Eichengreen (2002).  additional uncertainty makes private investments even lower and people’s desire to hold 
cash and liquid assets even higher, resulting in a lack of effective demand that does not 
expand the level of employment.  
Therefore, capital controls can be also seen as a way to ensure that national 
authorities will be able to implement expansionary policies aiming at reaching and 
maintaining full employment without fear of inducing capital flight. Palley (1998), for 
instance, argues in favor of the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime, but that at the 
same time capital mobility should be limited by use of some sort of capital controls, such as  
tax on capital inflows and/or the implementation of minimum term for permanence of 
capital flows (Chilean-style capital controls). This would permit that emerging countries 
improve their ability to achieve a more autonomous economic policy, and at the same time 
maintaining a more stable exchange rate – inspired in Keynes’ ideas but at the same time 
taking in account the new environment of financial globalization. We focus these issues in 
the next section.  
 
4. Managed floating exchange regime and capital controls: a strategy for the emerging 
countries 
 
  Since the Bretton Woods international monetary system collapsed in the early 
1970s, the process of globalization, characterized by increasing international mobility of 
capital and financial deregulation, has substantially altered the dynamics of the world 
economy. Moreover, in the absence of macroeconomic policies to stimulate economic 
growth and limit the destabilizing movements of capital flows, international capital 
mobility has created serious monetary and exchange problems for the world economy, 
especially for the emerging countries
15. According to Grabel (2003b: 251), “[e]conomies 
with internationally integrated, liquid, liberalized financial systems are inherently crisis 
prone”.  
  Going in this direction, one important discussion in the literature about 
macroeconomic issues in emerging countries is which exchange rate regime is more 
appropriate for these countries. On one hand, according to the “bipolar” view intermediary 
regimes – that involve all sorts of intermediary exchange rate regimes, that is between 
freely floating regime and fixed exchange rate regime – are less appropriate for economies 
with substantial involvement in international capital markets. The main argument is that 
such exchange rate regimes make countries more vulnerable to speculative attacks (Fischer, 
2001). On the other hand, the view called “fear of floating"’ points out that many emerging 
countries that adopt flexible exchange rate regime in practice seek to limit exchange rate 
movements. Such resistance to floating arises from their low policy and institutional 
credibility and high degree of pass-through of exchange rate changes into domestic prices, 
among other factors (Calvo and Reihart, 2002). Other reasons to why monetary authorities 
avoid exchange rate movements are related to the effects of excessive exchange rate 
volatility (mainly devaluation) on the outstanding foreign currency debts of banks and the 
corporate sectors with un-hedged foreign currency liabilities. In addition, exchange rate 
fluctuations may generate uncertainties that could impede trade. For instance, prolonged 
                                                 
15 The adoption of floating exchange rate regimes and free capital mobility by emerging countries 
has destabilized their currencies and leveraged exchange crises there, because their external fragility 
and vulnerability and dependence on foreign capital make them inherently unstable.  real appreciation associated with large capital inflows can adversely affect export 
competitiveness and investment in the external sector.   
Indeed, some economists (Edwards and Savastano, 2000; Edison, Levine, Ricci and 
Slok, 2002, Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) argue that a flexible exchange rate 
regime with capital account convertibility is fundamental for emerging countries to absorb 
the capital inflow and respond to the changing productive capacity in these economies
16. 
According to them, for an emerging country open to a substantial volume of international 
capital flows, a flexible exchange rate (i) reduces the sources of external vulnerability, and 
(ii) increases the efficiency of monetary policy to control the inflation rate; at the same 
time, financial liberalization (i) allocates efficiently savings (domestic and foreign), (ii) 
disciplines macroeconomic policies, and, consequently, (iii) improves the economic growth 
performance
17.   
  Eichengreen and Leblang (2002) and Rodrik (1998) show that it is difficult to 
establish a robust relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth 
performance for developed and, especially, emerging countries
18. Interestingly, 
Einchengreen and Legland (2002: 2) suggest that developed countries first developed their 
domestic financial market, followed by restricted capital account convertibility and after 
they liberalized their capital account: “the impact of capital account liberalization is more 
likely to be positive when the domestic financial system is smooth and stable. It is more 
likely to be negative when domestic and international financial markets are subject to 
crises”. So, it is likely that the causality between financial liberalization and economic 
growth is reverse: countries that have a robust economic growth can choose to take part of 
the financial integration, even if it does not contribute directly for a greater economic 
growth. 
One could argue that the adoption of a freely flexible exchange regime by emerging 
countries could isolate these countries from speculative attacks on domestic currency as 
government has no commitment with any level of exchange rate. Besides, floating 
exchange regime could increase the autonomy of monetary policy, overcoming the 
“impossible trinity” that says that a country cannot have at the same time capital account 
convertibility, fixed exchange rate regime and monetary policy autonomy in order to 
achieve domestic objectives. However, floating exchange regime frequently works in the 
real world differently from what is supposed in the textbooks. According to Grenville 
(2000), fundamentals cannot explain the behavior of exchange rate over a short/medium 
term horizon, that is exchange rate have at times exhibited long-lived swings with no 
apparent changes in fundamentals significant enough to justify them. The problems related 
to the exchange rate volatility are greater for emerging countries, as they have: (i) no long 
historical experience of market-determined exchange rate; (ii) few stabilizers speculators 
                                                 
16 According to the conventional (neoclassical) theory, capital should flow out of industrialized 
countries, where capital is abundant, into emerging countries where capital is scarce and, as a result, 
the rate of return to capital should be greater.  
17 Some economists argue that the discipline of fiscal and monetary policies are more important 
than the choice of exchange rate regime. See, for instance, Calvo and Mishkin (2003).    
18 Empirical evidence of capital account liberalisation upon economic performance is ambiguous 
while their links with financial crises are quite evident. Economists of IMF (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei 
and Kose, 2003: 3) resume the empirical findings of the literature: “a systematic examination of the 
evidence suggests that is difficult to establish a robust causal relationship between the degree of 
financial integration and output growth performance”.  acting in the exchange market, that is there has been a lack of players willing take 
contrarian foreign exchange positions in emerging countries; and (iii) much larger and 
volatile capital flows, in relation to the size of their capital markets and economies more 
generally. According to Ho and McCauley’s data (2003), despite of the rapid growth in 
activity during the 1990s, foreign exchange markets in most emerging countries continue to 
be relatively small and less liquidity than their counterparts in the industrial world. This 
suggests that emerging foreign exchange markets are more prone to one-sided bets and 
instability, because they are thin and subject to a high degree of uncertainty and 
information asymmetries (Moreno, 2005: 10). 
Flexibility in the operation of floating exchange regimes can be helpful in absorbing 
the capital inflow, in buffering external shocks, and responding to the changing productive 
capacity of emerging economies; it can also inhibit some short-term flows, by serving as a 
constant reminder that exchange rate volatility can outweigh the interest rate advantage of 
foreign currency borrowings (Grenville, 2000: 59). Some sort of managed floating 
exchange rates regime can be useful if the objective of the central bank is to reduce the 
exchange rate volatility and also influence somehow the real exchange rate for international 
trade purposes. Central bank intervenes in foreign exchange markets to achieve a variety of 
macroeconomic objectives, such as controlling inflation, maintaining external 
competitiveness and/or maintaining financial stability. Differently from a pegged exchange 
rate, authorities’ interventions to limit exchange rate movements may not target a certain 
level of the exchange rate, allowing nominal exchange rate to float in order to disincentive 
speculative capital flows  but may influence its path. The preservation of a competitive and 
stable real exchange rate can be use as an intermediate target of macroeconomic policies 
oriented to employment and growth objectives. According to Frenkel (2006: 579): 
“a competitive RER [real exchange rate] involves the distortion of 
domestic relative prices in favour of tradable activities against non-
tradable activities: the combination of higher protection for local 
activities that compete with imports with a higher competitiveness for 
export activities. Consequently, the RER affects the employment 
growth rate in the long run due to its influence on the output growth 
rate, through its incentive on investment in tradable activities that 
accelerates productivity growth and generates positive externalities in 
other sectors”. 
In order to enhance the possibility of a successful management of exchange rate 
regime in emerging markets can be necessary some measures to reduce the volatility of 
capital flows and the likelihood of speculation attack on domestic currency. One possibility 
is the use of official intervention in the foreign exchange market, that may exert direct 
influence on nominal exchange rate as it alters the relative supply of domestic and foreign 
currency assets. On one hand, the countries’ ability to resist currency depreciation is limited 
by its stock of foreign exchange reserves and its access to potential credit lines. Reserve 
accumulation can be seen as an insurance against future negative shocks and speculation 
against domestic currency, as emerging economies have limited access to international 
capital market. On the other hand, the ability to avoid currency appreciation may require 
the use of sterilized intervention. The accumulation of reserves requires some sort of 
financing due to the excess of foreign currency reserves over domestic currency in 
circulation. The central bank can finance this gap by issuing domestic monetary liabilities. 
If central banks have a target for the short-term rate, then they can attempt to offset increases in bank reserves selling domestic assets or issuing their own securities (Mohanty 
and Turner, 2006). 
There are some concerns about the prolonged use of foreign exchange intervention 
to resist currency appreciation. One concern is related to the fact that a large portfolio 
currency asset exposes the central bank to potential valuation losses for currency 
appreciation. A second concern is related to the carrying costs of reserves, that are 
determined by the difference between the return on domestic assets and foreign assets
19. 
Finally, continuous reserve accumulation might at some point raise problems for the central 
bank in controlling monetary growth. The assessment of the recent experience of exchange 
reserve accumulation in emerging countries shows evidences that such countries have so far 
been successful in sterilizing reserve operations (Mohanty and Scatigna, 2004; Mohanty 
and Turner, 2006). On one hand, carrying costs have been low or even negative in an 
important number of countries (including China, India and South Korea), although they 
have been high in some countries (Brazil and Indonesia). On the other hand, many central 
banks may have used reserve accumulation to expand the monetary base to deliberately 
ease monetary policy in an environment of low inflation and large excess capacity. Due to 
the effectiveness of official foreign exchange intervention and low inflation environment, 
real exchange rate have not risen significantly (or even fallen) in many countries with large 
and persistent current account surplus. 
Another possibility to enhance the management of exchange rate regime (that is not 
excluding with official intervention) in emerging countries is the use “capital management 
techniques” that includes “capital controls”, that is norms that manage volume, 
composition, and/or allocation of international private capital flows, and/or “prudential 
domestic financial regulations”, that refer to policies, such as capital-adequacy standards, 
reporting requirements, or restrictions on the ability and terms under which domestic 
financial institutions can provide to certain types of projects
20 (Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 
2003: 6-7).  
Capital controls can be used for different sometimes related objectives, such as (i) to 
reduce the vulnerability of a country to financial crises, including capital flight during any 
currency crisis, (ii) to drive a wedge between onshore and offshore interest rates in order to 
provide monetary authorities with some policy autonomy at least in the short-run, and (iii) 
to maintain some  short-term stability of nominal exchange rate and to reduce exchange rate 
pressures derived from excessive capital inflows. For this purpose capital controls can be 
used to change the composition and maturity structure of flows (towards longer maturity 
flows) and to enhance monetary authorities’ ability to act in the exchange foreign market. 
Although the effectiveness of capital controls are very controversial, evidence 
suggests that the macroeconomic benefits of capital management techniques can outweigh 
the microeconomic costs as show some recent experiences. Magud and Reihart (2006) 
review more than 30 papers that evaluated  capital controls either on inflows or outflows 
around the world (the evaluation excludes countries with comprehensive capital controls, 
such as China and India), making use of a capital controls effectiveness index in order to 
                                                 
19 Cost of sterilisation is calculated as the spread between the domestic and the USD one-year 
Treasury bill rate, applied to the total outstanding stock of foreign exchange reserves in domestic 
currency.  
20 Prudential controls can include: (i) to limit the opportunities for residents to borrow in foreign 
currency and to monitor them when they do, and (ii) to keep very tight constraints on banks’ ability 
to have open foreign exchange positions or indirect exposure through foreign exchange loans.  standardize the results of the empirical studies. They conclude that “capital controls on 
inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent; alter the composition of capital 
flow; reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence is more controversial)”, 
but “seem not to reduce the volume of net flows (and hence, the current account balance)”, 
while “limiting private external borrowing in the ‘good times’ plays an important prudential 
role because more often than not countries that are ‘debt intolerant’” (Ibid.: 26-27). In the 
same connection Ho and McCauley (2003: 34) concludes that “recent experience has 
shown that capital controls, if properly designed and applied, can be helpful in protecting 
the economy against the destabilizing aspects of capital flows, supporting the 
implementation of other policies and even resolving certain types of policy dilemma”. 
Summing up, taking in account the discussion developed in this section and in line 
with Keynes’ proposals presented in the second section and the Post Keynesian view on 
globalization financial system showed in section 3, it is felt that managed floating exchange 
rate regime and imperfect capital mobility are more appropriate to emerging countries, 
because they make possible the adoption of contra-cyclical economic policies, fiscal and 
monetary, necessary to permit macroeconomic stabilization.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the increased 
international mobility of capital and financial liberalization – i.e. the globalization process – 
has substantially altered the dynamic process of world economy. In other words, the 
globalization process has limited the actions of macroeconomic policies and national states 
to stimulate effective demand and, as consequence, increase the level of employment.   
Moreover, in the absence of government macroeconomic policies to stimulate economic 
growth and to limit the movements of capital flows, international speculative capital flows 
have created serious financial and exchange rate problems in the world economy, specially 
in the emerging countries
21.  
Globalization, in turn, tends by it very nature to disrupt not only domestic markets, 
but whole countries, especially emerging countries, by establishing a kind of extended 
financial casino. Keynes, in Chapter 12 of his GT, sees strong connections between the real 
and financial sectors of the economy. One such connection is the impact of speculative 
activities on production activities, and especially on investment. To quote a passage from 
GT in which Keynes identifies a connection between the real and financial sectors of the 
economy: 
“the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to 
be ill-done” (Keynes, 1936/1964: 159). 
                                                 
21 It is important to add that, due to (i) the significant increase in the volume and speed of fund 
transfers on the international financial market, (ii) the blurring of boundaries between markets and 
(iii) greater integration among financial markets worldwide, the economic dynamics of those 
decades came to be known as the process of financial globalization. One consequence of this 
process is the tendency for a single world money and credit market to be established. In this regard, 
see Ferrari Filho and Paula (2004).  This paper shows that – as recommended by Keynesian theory – in a context of 
financial globalization, i.e. greater economic interdependence and more intense inter-
country capital flows, conditions must be created in order for national economic policies to 
be operated autonomously. On this point, in view of the lack of any institutional 
arrangement for international monetary cooperation to organize the world economy, 
emerging countries’ response to financial globalization depends on their introducing (i) 
mechanisms to permit exchange rate management to assure domestic policy objectives and 
promote a more predictable environment for productive investment and productive activity 
in general and (ii) capital controls to preserve the independence of their economic, and 
especially monetary, policies. 
To conclude, it is important to stress that managed exchange rate regimes and 
capital controls are not ends in themselves, but are means to achieving economic 
prosperity, full employment and more equitable income distribution among individuals and 
among countries. In this context, according to Davidson (1997: 672) “what is necessary is 
to build permanent fireproofing rules and structures that prevent ‘beauty contest’ induced 
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